Annual Lecture on China. Amid joint Russian-U.S. efforts, the Working Group on the Future of U.S.-Russia Relationsrecommendedseveral elements of an agreement in 2016, among them that Russia and the U.S. agree on the types of information that are to be shared in the event of a cyberattack (akin to responses to a bio-weapons attack) and prohibit both automatic retaliation in cases of cyberattacks and attacks on elements of another nations core internet infrastructure. Most recently, in June 2021, a group of U.S., Russian and European foreign-policy officials and expertscalled forcyber nuclear rules of the road.. If their DOD cyberspace is not adequately protected, the adversary will exploit it and may even achieve physical effects such as shutting down critical infrastructure or weapon systems, while ensuring any digital footprint is not attributable. Hearing some of these calls, we at Russia Matters and the U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism were moved to probe them further: Is a cyber rules-of-the-road agreement feasible? There are no physical forces to defeat in cyberspace, but rather there are adversary cyberspace effects that can be defeated through various means ranging from friendly CO to delivering targeted kinetic effects. a lone server in a random unprotected closet that all operational data passes through). Andrey Krutskikh, the Kremlin's bombastic point man on cyber-diplomacy issues, likened Russia's development of cyber capabilities that year to the Soviet Union's first successful atomic bomb test in 1949. FOIA A cyberattack does not necessarily require a cyber response, she added. (Figure 4). We will give a quick summary of these organizations as this will help you understand when we address the complications and solutions for CCMDs. The DOD cyberspace backbone is called the DODIN. Force Readiness Command 2020 National Defense Industrial Association. Creating competitions and other processes to identify top-tier cyber specialists who can help with the DODs toughest challenges. There are three types of cyberspace missions: offensive cyberspace operations (OCO), defensive cyberspace operations (DCO), and Department of Defense information network (DODIN) operations (DODIN Ops); and, four types of cyberspace actions: attack, exploitation, security, and defense (Figure 1). While the U.S. military built up the latter, the issue of when and where the United States should use cyber operations failed to keep pace with new capabilities. Coast Guard Looking for crowdsourcing opportunities such as hack-a-thons and bug bounties to identify and fix our own vulnerabilities. The NNSA, according to Gordon-Hargerty, has three main objectives, to maintain the safety, security and reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation. NOCs configure, operate, extend, maintain, and sustain the CCMD cyberspace and are primarily responsible for operating CCMD cyberspace. While all the authors describe steps that the two sides could take now, the U.S. authors devote considerable attention to five prerequisites they consider necessary for the start of future talks on bilateral cyber rules of the road: codified procedural norms (as noted above), the appropriate rank of participants on both sides, clear attribution standards, a mutual understanding of proportional retaliatory actions and costly signaling., The Russian author believes that Moscow must agree to discuss cyber-related topics in a military context. While the Russian author believes the U.S. should be more open to dialogue without preconditions, the American authors call for codified procedures for negotiations, with a clearly defined timeline and set list of topics, as one of the conditions for moving toward a bilateral cyber agreement. The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and 2018 Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning present the idea of global integration: arranging military actions in time, space, and purpose to address security challenges. The CCMD-constructed networks are the only portion of the DODIN that the CCMD is directly responsible for. Automation and large-scale data analytics will help identify cyberattacks and make sure our systems are still effective. Using insights from the Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) dataset, this policy brief by Ketaki Zodgekar outlines key trends in the use of sexual violence in Russias war against Ukraine between 2014 and 2021. Cyberspace is critical to the way the entire U.S. functions. No FEAR Act 4. Both, for instance, view the other as a highly capable adversary. DACO has been delegated to JFHQ-DODIN and provides authority to direct cyberspace operations related to global DODIN operations and DCO-IDM within each DOD components DAO. Open and reliable access to the Internet is essential for global security and prosperity. Additionally, once all MRT-C and KT-C are identified, the information should be stored and shared using an existing secure database. Justin Sherman (@jshermcyber) is a fellow at the Atlantic Councils Cyber Statecraft Initiative. [7] Pomerleau, Mark, The Pentagon is moving away from the Joint Regional Security Stacks, C4ISRNET, November 1 2021, https://www.c4isrnet.com/it-networks/2021/11/01/the-pentagon-is-moving-away-from-the-joint-regional-security-stacks/. limiting the collective reach of U.S. cyber operations at any given time; it also ignores the concept of points of leverage in the broader internet ecosystem. The Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff has primacy in external cyberspace operations, to include espionage, information warfare, and offensive cyberspace operations. Often, there are pieces of cyberspace terrain that are critical for mission or network function that are not obvious (e.g. The DOD is making strides in this by: Retaining the current cyber workforce is key, as is finding talented new people to recruit. Air Land Sea Application Center, We have no room for complacency and history makes it clear that America has no preordained right to victory on the battlefield.Secretary James N. That means a thorough strategy is needed to preserve U.S. cyberspace superiority and stop cyberattacks before they hit our networks. Question 1. - Foreign Policy, Analysis & Opinions All DOD organizations share cyberspace information and intelligence securely, and cyberspace is fully incorporated into joint force planning and operations. USA.gov The U.S. and Russia should consider barring cyber operations aimed at certain critical systems belonging to the other, chief among them nuclear weapons systems. Nonetheless, events since 2016 reflect a convergence of the two factors. NATO's main focus in cyber defence is to protect its own networks, operate in cyberspace (including through the Alliance's operations and missions), help Allies to enhance their national resilience and provide a platform for political consultation and collective action. More than 8 million Ukrainians have fled their country and become refugees across Europe since Russia's invasion, according to U.N. data. This step is critical to inform cyberspace defensive planning and operations. - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School. 2, 2021. Polyethylene Film / PE Sheet [5] In a nutshell, it simply involves following a missions data path across networks. The U.S. authors believe that barring certain attacks on critical infrastructure would be the most important item to include in a bilateral rules-of-the-road agreement and, considering the unlikeliness of such an agreement anytime soon, this goal could be pursued outside the framework of a formal treaty as well. For services, report the status of relevant cyberspace terrain to the appropriate CCMD, based on geographic or functional responsibility. The Pentagon now views space as a warfighting domain on par with land, sea, air and cyber, as advanced adversaries such as China and Russia bolster their anti-satellite weapons. By entering your email and clicking subscribe, you're agreeing to receive announcements from CFR about our products and services, as well as invitations to CFR events. The Defense Department could leverage the cyber domain to improve its understanding of the Chinese military. This vastly improves component awareness of potential operational impacts from a cyberspace perspective. As the joint force shifts its focus towards trans-regional, all-domain, multi-functional (TAM) strategic competition, nowhere are these concepts more relevant than in cyberspace. February 13, 2023 updating perimeter or endpoint security configurations), but if they discover an adversary, they can take cyberspace defense actions to defeat the adversary (e.g. Our research shows, however, that the role countries are likely to assume in decarbonized energy systems will be based not only on their resource endowment but also on their policy choices. In just a few years, Air Force Space Commands General John Raymond went from being an opponent of the Space Force to its first Chief of Space Operations![10]. China is using cyber espionage for military and economic advantages, Mortelmans said. An official website of the United States Government. Sharing information with other federal agencies, our own agencies, and foreign partners and allies who have advanced cyber capabilities. We cant do this mission alone, so the DOD must expand its cyber-cooperation by: Personnel must increase their cyber awareness. Yet, the services have their own network operating independently within the CCMD AOR and, therefore, the CCMD is unaware of all activities that could have an impact on their current and future operations. "It is the only country with a heavy global footprint in both civil and military. Holding DOD personnel and third-party contractors more accountable for slip-ups. An example would be an attack on critical infrastructure such as the power grid. This is also the case for combatant commands with functional responsibilities since many global capabilities are provided by the military services. These include: Protecting DOD Cyberspace, Now and Beyond. We proceeded to formulate research questions (see Appendix 2) and seek out authors who could separately explore the American and the Russian perspectives on the cyber-treaty idea. As this process matures, cyberspace planners will know what MRT-C and KT-C must be protected throughout all phases of the various scenarios in joint force plans and operations. November 4, 2022 By Natasha Yefimova-Trilling and Simon Saradzhyan, In recent years, as news of U.S.-Russian tensions in the cyber domain has dominated headlines, some strategic thinkers have pointed to the need for a bilateral cyber rules of the road agreement. Upholding cyberspace behavioral norms during peacetime. In response to these threats, U.S. Cyber Command has taken a comprehensive and proactive approach, she said, that involves being able to defend forward anywhere in the world, in order to respond to cyber and other threats before they reach the homeland, Mortelmans said. - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, Analysis & Opinions By also sharing this information with JFHQ-DODIN, this establishes awareness of the DODs cybersecurity posture, DOD-wide. Appendix 2 69, Analysis & Opinions Space Force The Pardee RAND Graduate School (PardeeRAND.edu) is home to the only Ph.D. and M.Phil. Academic and Higher Education Webinars, C.V. Starr & Co. If so, what form could it take? Arlington, There are also cyber criminals who pose a growing threat from their use of ransomware to extort money from local and state governments as well as the commercial sector, she said. Although the existence of a separate Air Force is no longer controversial, its creation was often characterized by resistance from within the military amidst advocacy from civilian political pressures. This statement could be a result of the DoD's limited . WhatsApp. Should the US and Russia Pursue Confidence-Building Measuresand, if So, Which Ones? Is Chinas Huawei a Threat to U.S. National Security? Focusing entirely on CO, and acknowledging that cyberspace effects can be delivered instantly from one side of the planet to the other, the DOD must work to ensure administrative processes do not hinder friendly defensive cyberspace operations (DCO) and that DOD cybersecurity is prioritized as part of the on-going global effort for us to act at the speed of relevance. January 31, 2022, How Tobacco Laws Could Help Close the Racial Gap on Cancer, Interactive In this paper, Sarah Sewall, Tyler Vandenberg, and Kaj Malden evaluate Chinas Global Navigation Satellite System, BeiDou, and urge policymakers to look more closely at the effects of global reliance upon BeiDou. - Foreign Affairs, Paper Twitter. A dual identity (military and law enforcement) and alignment under the Department of Homeland Security allow a separate cyber service to protect our nations global infrastructure from state actors who will be indistinguishable from criminal threats. Note: Please see the explanation below for further . At some point theU.S. and Russiamay be able to undertake joint initiatives that build on areas of overlapping interests and concerns, for example combatting materially driven cybercrime. By Maj Eric Pederson (USAF), MAJ Don Palermo (USA), MAJ Stephen Fancey (USA), LCDR (Ret) Tim Blevins Both systems are crucial to the global internets very function and yet remain fundamentally insecurevulnerable to outright manipulation. Building dependable partnerships with private-sector entities who are vital to helping support military operations. Capabilities are going to be more diverse and adaptable. Moreover, it is a policy of NDIA to take appropriate actions under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and other applicable intellectual property laws. A highly regarded news source for defense professionals in government and industry, National Defense offers insight and analysis on defense programs, policy, business, science and technology. While the United States has displayed a growing willingness to launch operations against Russia, Moscow has somewhat bolstered its military cyber capacity by expanding recruiting initiatives and malware development. The Russian author does not speculate on national interests per se but does describe major cyber-related disagreements between Russia and the U.S. in at least three major areas: the role of government in overseeing cyberspace; the militarization of cyberspace and the related applicability of existing international law; and the idea of legally binding treaties versus non-binding guidelines for how information and communication technologies should be used. Defending forward includes understanding what adversaries are trying to do and what the threat looks like. This will increase effectiveness. The Russian Federation's willingness to engage in offensive cyber operations has caused enormous harm, including massive financial losses, interruptions to the operation of critical infrastructure, and disruptions of crucial software supply chains. The New York Cyber Task Forces 2017 report discusses the idea of leverage, for instance, in a somewhat productized sense vis--vis software and internet security. A gulf in both the will to use cyber operations and the capacity to launch them separated the two for almost 20 years. - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, News perimeter and endpoints sensors) and their deployment within each DAO and across the DODIN, Standardizing data aggregation at local (local network log/data collection), regional (base/camp/post/station collection), and enterprise (big data) levels, as well as what data is fed to higher echelons. There is a hierarchy based on roles and responsibilities (Figure 5) when it comes to protecting cyberspace as part of the joint force. Updating contract language with DOD partners in a timely manner to address current cybersecurity issues such as enabling cybersecurity-related information sharing across the DOD and limiting/governing cleared defense contractors (CDC) remote access into the DODIN. Assistant Policy Researcher, RAND, and Ph.D. Student, Pardee RAND Graduate School, Ph.D. Student, Pardee RAND Graduate School, and Assistant Policy Researcher, RAND, Steam rises from the chimneys of a thermal power plant behind the Ivan the Great Bell Tower in Moscow, Russia January 9, 2018. The Russian government tries to maintain greater control over domestic cyberspace than does the U.S., primarily to ensure political stability. While the U.S. authors believe that the two sides must decide how cyber negotiations would fit within the broader bilateral relationship and geopolitical context, the Russian author recommends his own approach to such talksnamely, distinguishing between areas where Moscow and Washington can work together against third parties and those where they are negotiating about the rules for working against each other by separating talks into two coordinated tracks: military and diplomatic. Appendix 1 67 Sgt. Kyle Hanslovan, a cyber-warfare specialist serving with the 175th Cyberspace Operations Group of the Maryland Air National Guard, works in the Hunter's Den at Warfield Air National Guard Base, Middle River, Md., Dec. 2, 2017. However, this idea is not only unrealistic, with resource constraints (in personnel, target information, access to adversary networks, organizational capacity, etc.) [5] U.S. Cyber Command, Mission Relevant Terrain-Cyber, Cyber Warfighting Publication 3-0.1, 20 August 2021, [6] Russel, W. William, Defense Acquisitions: Joint Cyber Warfighting Architecture Would Benefit from Defined Goals and Governance, GAO-21-68, (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2020). These concepts describe the approach required for the cyberspace domain. Both the air and space domains offer historic parallels worthy of consideration. This is different from a traditional campaign designed around the idea that the world is either at peace or at war. JUST IN: U.S. Space Command to Leverage AI to Maintain Digital Superiority. For example, they've made attempts to interfere in the 2016, 2018 and now 2020 U.S. elections, as well as elections of allies and partners. C.V. Starr & Co. Finally, as noted above, the U.S. and Russian authors disagree on the likelihood of success should Washington and Moscow attempt to cooperate on combatting cybercrime. Data routing security is one such example. Structure of a US-Russia Cyber Agreement 17 All CCMDs except for USCYBERCOM have ten roles and responsibilities assigned to them via the 2021 Unified Command Plan (UCP) for protecting their cyberspace and the one that is most applicable is: secure, operate, and defend tactical and constructed DODIN segments within their commands and areas of responsibility. (NB: The U.S. authors are more skeptical about such efforts than the Russian author.). One thing though all can be certainly sure of, is that there are others out there based in many places elsewhere, who be of a similar persuasion to be a pioneering prime lead in such a predominant field of ACTive IT Endeavour, and equally enthusiastically interested in programs and projects of advanced intelligent design built and maintained to not fail, and being further developed to exceed all expectations with guaranteed stability in overwhelmingly powerful performance situations/great game changing events. The U.S. recently suspended its obligations under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and gave notice of its intent to withdraw after long-term violations of the treaty by Russia, a. U.S. cyber strategy should therefore emphasize that steps within the cyber domain to exploit or protect those points of leverage do more than alter the position of each actor involvedthey also alter the cyber environment itself.. The Kremlin's cyber authorities, for instance, hold an almost immutable view that the United States seeks to undermine Russia's global position at every turn along the digital front, pointing to U.S. cyber operations behind global incidents that are unfavorable to Moscow's foreign policy goals. Unlike the air domain, the space domain is expanding as a realm of competition nearly simultaneously with another domain: cyberspace. Below we outline points on which the authors agree, disagree or cover ground that their counterparts did not. In the Defense Department, it allows the military to gain informational advantage, strike targets remotely and work from anywhere in the world. [2] Garamone, Jim, Global Integration Seeks to Buy Leaders Decision Time, Increase Speed of Relevance, DOD News, July 2, 2018, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/1565240/global-integration-seeks-to-buy-leaders-decision-time-increase-speed-of-relevan/. Mattis.[1]. The report drew skepticism from some experts and a denial from the administration, but the revelation led Moscow to warn that such activity presented a direct challenge that demanded a response. Each of the 44 DOD components owns a portion of the DODIN area of operation (DAO) and is responsible for protecting it. About ALSSA 2101 Wilson Blvd, Suite 700 The Russian author likewise believes the U.S. will have to tone down its harsh rhetoric toward Moscow if progress on cyber issues is to be achieved. This graphic describes the four pillars of the U.S. National Cyber Strategy. Potential Basis for Cooperation 48 Cyber confrontation between the United States and Russia is increasingly turning to critical civilian infrastructure, particularly power grids, judging from recent press reports. JFHQ-DODIN which is a component command of USCYBERCOM is the organization that is responsible for securing, operating, and defending the DOD complex infrastructure of roughly 15,000 networks with 3 million users. The Russian government tries to maintain greater control over domestic cyberspace than does the U.S., primarily to ensure political stability. Arguably, the DODs established processes and bureaucracy are not suited to the fast-paced world of cyberspace. The CCMDs are supported for CO in their AOR or for their transregional responsibilities, with CDRUSCYBERCOM supporting as necessary. From a defensive cyberspace perspective, the threat to the Department of Defense (DOD) has never been greater. This concentration is necessary because just as there are cybersecurity technologies that give leverage to a defender, some vectors of compromise give disproportionate leverage to attackers. A CCMD should go to its COIPE, JCC, CSSP, and NOC to obtain its operationally assigned cyberspace from JFHQ-DODIN. Choose which Defense.gov products you want delivered to your inbox. Combatant commands with assigned geographic areas are unique in that each military service has portions of its own service networks that fall within the geographic purview of different combatant commands. Strengthening the cybersecurity of systems and networks that support DOD missions, including those in the private sector and our foreign allies and partners. This comprehensive approach creates interesting synergies for the Russian military. However, growing cyber threats from state and non-state actors threaten those values,the Defense Department's principal director for Cyber Policy said. If you become aware of postings that violate these rules regarding acceptable behavior or content, you may contact NDIA at 703.522.1820. DHS and FBI characterize this activity as a multi-stage intrusion campaign by Russian government cyber actors who targeted small commercial facilities' networks where they staged malware, conducted spear phishing, and gained remote access into energy sector networks. Figure1: Cyberspace Operations Missions, Actions, and Forces. Chris Smith, members of the Connecticut National Guard's Joint Cyber Response Team, assist the city of Hartford, Conn., information technology team, Sept. 9, 2020, in recovery efforts following a ransomware attack that occurred Sept. 4, 2020. Joint Cyberspace Organizations, Structures, Roles, and Responsibilities. Disclaimer. In the case of . Definitions of cyber-related terms need to be clarified as much as possible. The end state of all these initiatives is that DOD cybersecurity efforts have moved away from localized efforts and expertise, and transitioned to established cybersecurity standards across the DOD. Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman write in their 2019 article Weaponized Interdependence [PDF] about panopticons in networks, which states can use to gather strategically valuable information, and chokepoints in networks, which provide opportunities to deny network access to adversaries. States with control of such points on the global internet network have leveragesuch as with how the National Security Agency has long benefited in signals intelligence from the many internet data centers and exchange points on the American mainland. Renewables are widely perceived as an opportunity to shatter the hegemony of fossil fuel-rich states and democratize the energy landscape. The Domain Name System, the internets phone book for addressing traffic, and the Border Gateway Protocol, the internets GPS for routing traffic, were both designed with a preference for speed and reliability over security. Western analysts, fixated on untangling the now-defunct concept of the Gerasimov Doctrine, devoted far less attention to the Russian military's actual cyber experts, who starting in 2008 wrote a series of articles about the consequences of Washington's perceived militarization of cyberspace, including a mid-2016 finale that discussed Russia's need to pursue cyber peace with the United States by demonstrating an equal information potential..

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